The existence of a common prior is a property of the state space used to model the players' incomplete information. We show that this property is not just a technical artifact of the model, but that it is immanent to the players' beliefs. To this end, we devise a condition, phrased solely in terms of the players' mutual beliefs about the basic, objective issues of possible uncertainty, which is equivalent to the existence of a common prior. This condition specifies a procedure of enquiry addressed to the players, which detects when there is no common prior among them.
Introduction
The common prior assumption (Harsanyi 1967-68 ) is pervasive in most economic models of incomplete information. It asserts that the beliefs of individuals in different states of the world are the posteriors they form given their private information from a prior which is common to them all. Morris (1995) elaborates the possible normative justifications for this assumption.
However, when states of the world are constructed from explicit descriptions of the individuals' hierarchies of mutual beliefs (Mertens and Zamir 1985) , it turns out that belief subspaces with a common prior are the exception rather than the rule. In particular, a common prior does not emerge from any natural assumption in this explicit construction of economic types. The positive value of the common priors assumption is therefore at stake: By examining the beliefs of individuals at a given situation (or "state of the world"), can one tell whether they originate from a common prior? If the answer is negative, it means that having a common prior can only be meaningful for the modeler, who observes it as a mere technical regularity across the states in the model, with no economic content. If, on the other hand, the answer is positive, the assumption is testable, and in any specific economic interaction we can check for its validity by eliciting the beliefs of individuals in the situation at hand.
Up till now, the literature offers characterizations of the common prior assumption in terms of the expectations the individuals ascribe to random variables (Morris 1994 , Samet 1998a ,b, Bonanno and Nehring 1999 , 1 Halpern 2002 2 ). In the way they are presented, it is not clear whether these characterizations are positive in the above sense: To describe a random variable, the individuals have to know the structure of the state space, which is an abstract construct of the modeler, and not necessarily the form in which the individuals grasp the uncertain environment in which they act. Alternatively, Feinberg (2000) offers a characterization in terms of the individuals' beliefs regarding events in an augmented state space, which incorporates the outcomes of a commonly known randomizing device. Here again, an exogenous construct (the randomizing device) has to be alluded to.
The main contribution we propose here is in showing that when the state space is compact, we have a positive characterization for the existence of a common prior, which requires only the elicitation of the individuals' mutual beliefs on the fundamentals of the interaction (the basic or "nature" events), like payoffs entailed by the possible actions. In such an enquiry, the questions posed to the individuals can be phrased using expressions in natural language, without referring to any model or abstract structure. The main propositions of the paper specify a sequence of questions with which the individuals should be addressed, such that a positive answer to any of them detects the lack of a common prior.
Section 2 presents the technical preliminaries and definitions. Section 3 contains the statement and proof of the main result. The appendix brings a very short proof to a characterization of common priors in compact spaces due to Feinberg (2000) , generalizing a technique of Samet (1998a) .
Preliminaries
Let {1, . . . , I} be a set of individuals. We denote by Σ 0 a countable set of basic expressions, which describe objective circumstances relevant to the interaction between the individuals. These may be "NASDAQ went up X% today" or "this combination of actions by the individuals will result by those payoffs for them", but not any assertion that involves the beliefs or knowledge of the individuals.
For every expression E and a rational number p ∈ [0, 1], let B p i (E) be the expression "individual i assigns probability at least p to the event E", and let ¬E be the expression "not E." For two expressions E and F, let E ∩ F be the expression "E and F."
The collection E of expressions is the one generated from the basic expressions Σ 0 by using consecutively ¬, ∩ and B p i . Notice that the collection of expressions is countable, and thus can be enumerated in a sequence.
A (topological) type space is a Hausdorff space Ω, such that every individual i in the set {1, . . . , I} of individuals has a regular Borel probability measure t i (ω) on Ω in every state ω ∈ Ω. This type mapping t i from Ω to the space ∆(Ω) of regular Borel probability measures is assumed to be continuous, when ∆(Ω) is endowed with the topology of weak convergence 3 . The Borel subsets Σ of Ω are called events.
We assume that a subset of events Σ can be identified with the set of basic expressions Σ 0 . This means that Σ is rich enough to capture the basic issues about which there may be mutual uncertainty among the individuals.
For every event E ∈ Σ and a rational number p ∈ [0, 1], define the events
With these definitions 4 , the collection of expressions E is identified with a countable sub-field of events in Σ.
We assume that for every individual i ∈ {1, . . . , I} , an event E ∈ Σ and a rational number
3 This topology is generated by the sub-basis of sets of the form
where O ⊆ Ω is open and r ∈ R (see e.g Billingsley 1968, appendix III). When Ω is Normal (and in particular compact and/or metric), this topology coincides with the weak- * topology -the weakest topology for which the mapping
is continuous for every contiunuous real-valued function f on Ω. 4 The continuity of t i guarantees that
In other words, P i is a prior if i's types t i (ω) are the posteriors of P i conditional on i's information function t i . The probability measure P ∈ ∆(Ω) is a common prior if it is a prior for each of the individuals i ∈ {1, . . . , I} .
In the analysis below, we will assume that Ω is not the union of proper beliefsubspaces, i.e. that it is not the case that for some event E ( Ω we have both
A Positive Characterization of Common Priors
The main result of this work is the characterization of common priors in terms of expressions and descriptions when the type space is compact. We first phrase and prove it for the case of two individuals, and generalize the result to an arbitrary finite number of players.
For the positive characterization we rely on the following proposition due to Feinberg (2000) . The appendix brings a very short proof of the proposition, generalizing a technique of Samet (1998) .
Proposition 1 Let Ω be a compact type space with two individuals i ∈ {1, 2}. Then there is no common prior among them if and only if there is a continuous random variable
for every ω ∈ Ω.
Building on this proposition, we can now provide the positive characterization:
Proposition 2 Let Ω be a compact type space with two individuals i ∈ {1, 2}. Then there is no common prior in Ω if and only if there are expressions E 1 , . . . , E n and rational numbers {p r k , q r k : k = 1, . . . n, r = 1, . . . , s} such that whatever is the state of the world ω ∈ Ω which describes the situation at hand, the expression
for r = 1, . . . , s Remark 1. As there are countably many expressions of the form (3.2) satisfying (3.3), they can be ordered in a sequence. A typical enquiry that corresponds to such an expression (3.2) is as follows:
1. "Individual 1, is there common belief between you and individual 2 that for some r between 1 and s it is the case that for every k = 1, . . . n you don't ascribe probability at least p r k to E k , while individual 2 ascribes probability at least q r k to E k ?" 2. "Individual 2, is there common belief between you and individual 1 that for some r between 1 and s it is the case that for every k = 1, . . . n you ascribe probability at least q r k to E k , while individual 1 doesn't ascribe probability at least p r k to E k ?"
If the answers to both of these questions is positive for at least one of the expressions (3.2) in the sequence, proposition 2 asserts that there is no common prior. In such a case, by interviewing the individuals with this sequence of questions, it is possible to conclude the absence of a common prior after a finite number of questions.
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Proof of Proposition 2. If there is a common prior, there can be no common belief among the individuals that they disagree on the expectation of the random variable P n k=1 χ E k (where χ F is the indicator function of the event F ) -see e.g. Cave (1983) or Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) . But a common belief of such a disagreement follows from (3.2) and (3.3).
In the reverse direction, suppose there is no common prior. By proposition 1, (3.1) holds for some continuous f. Since t 1 and t 2 are continuous maps, the functions G i : Ω → R defined by
are continuous. As Ω is compact, the functions G i attain their minimum and maximum on Ω, so for some rational ε > 0 we have
Since f is continuous, for every rational x we have that f 
for some rational numbers x 1 , . . . , x m .
Define F 1 = O 1 , and then inductively F`= O`\ (∪ k<`Ok ) for k = 2, . . . , m. Then Ω is the disjoint union of the expressions F 1 , . . . , F m . Define
Then |f (ω 0 ) − g(ω 0 )| < ε for every ω 0 ∈ Ω, and we conclude that
Let d the least common denominator of the rational numbers x 1 , . . . , x m . For some large enough positive integer c, the function
assumes finitely many positive integer values, and has the form
where E 1 , . . . , E n is the list of expressions in which for`= 1, . . . , m, and ω ∈ F`, the expression F`appears h(ω) times in the list. (3.12) and q
It follows that for
Then for every ω ∈ Ω, the expression
holds at ω, and by (3.11)
: ω ∈ Ω} is finite (the number of its elements does not exceed (L + 1)
2 ), and therefore it can be written as {(p for r = 1, . . . , s. Since Ω is common belief in any of its states, the conclusion of the proposition follows. ¥ We now turn to generalize this result for more than two individuals. Here again we rely on the following proposition by Feinberg (2000) .
Proposition 3
Let Ω be a compact type space with individuals {1, . . . , I}. Then there is no common prior among them if and only if there are continuous random variables f i : Ω → R, i = 1, . . . , I for which
Proposition 4 Let Ω be a compact type space with individuals i ∈ {1, . . . , I}. Then there is no common prior among them if and only if there are expressions
, a positive integer c and rational numbers © p r k,i , q r k,i : i = 2, . . . , I, k = 1, . . . n i , r = 1, . . . , s ª such that whatever is the state of the world ω ∈ Ω which describes the situation at hand, the expression
is common belief at ω, while
for r = 1, . . . , s
Remark 2. Here again, there are countably many expressions (3.20) satisfying (3.21) and (3.22), and they can therefore be ordered in a sequence. Hence, an enquiry procedure for the lack of a common prior can be easily phrased, as in Remark 1 above.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that (3.20) is common belief while (3.21) and (3.22) obtain. Then there can be no common prior. Indeed, if there had been a common prior P, then for
and
we would have by (3.21) and (3.22) that 10 for every
which is impossible since
In the reverse direction, suppose there is no common prior. By proposition 3 there are continuous random variables f i : Ω → R, i = 1, . . . , I for which (3.18) and (3.19) obtain. Since t i are continuous maps, the functions G i : Ω → R defined by 3.27) are continuous. As Ω is compact, the functions G i achieve their minimum and maximum on Ω, so for some rational ε > 0 we have
Since the functions f i are continuous, for every rational x we have that f , where for`= 1, . . . , m i
for some rational numbers
Then for every i = 1, . . . , I, the space Ω is the disjoint union of the expressions
for every ω 0 ∈ Ω, so we conclude from (3.28) and (3.31) that Z (3.33) and from (3.28) and (3.32) that
Let d the least common denominator of the rational numbers
. For some large enough positive integer c, the functions (3.35) assume each finitely many positive integer values, and have the form
where
is the list of expressions in which for`= 1, . . . , m i , and ω ∈ F ì , the expression F ì appears h i (ω) times in the list.
It follows from (3.33) and (3.34) that for
. . , I, k = 1, . . . n i , r = 1, . . . , s ª for some finite number s. It follows that the expression
holds in all the states of Ω, while
for r = 1, . . . , s.
Since Ω is common belief in any of its states, the conclusion of the proposition follows. ¥
Appendix
A short proof of Proposition 1. For each of the players i = 1, 2, the map ω → t i (ω) is continuous. Hence the image of this map, t i (Ω) -player i's set of types -is a compact subset of ∆(Ω), and therefore so is its closed convex hull -player i's set of priors P(t i (Ω)). 11 Thus, when there is no common prior, the two sets of priors can be strongly separated: There is a continuous linear functional F on ∆(Ω) and a number c for which F (p 1 ) < c < F (p 2 ) for priors p 1 , p 2 of players 1 and 2 (and in particular their types t 1 (ω), t 2 (ω)), respectively.
By the Riesz representation theorem, ∆(Ω) is the space of continuous linear functionals on the space C(Ω) of continuous functions on Ω, with the definition µ(f ) = 11 More explicitly, the mapping P :
for real valued continuous functions f ∈ C(Ω) is continuous, because the integrand on the right-hand side is a real-valued continuous function on ∆(Ω) (if {ν α } is a net in ∆(Ω) that converges to ν ∈ ∆(Ω),
for every f ∈ C(Ω), since R for every f ∈ C(Ω), which, by definition of the weak- * topology on ∆(Ω), implies that P(ν α ) → P(ν)). Therefore P (∆(Ω)) -the set of priors of player i -is compact as the continuous image of a compact set.
R Ω f(·)dµ(·) for f ∈ C(Ω) and µ ∈ ∆(Ω). Furthermore, the real valued mapping hµ, f i ≡ R Ω f(·)dµ(·) from ∆(Ω) × C(Ω) is bilinear and separates the points of ∆(Ω) and C(Ω). Hence, when ∆(Ω) is endowed with the weak- * topology, C(Ω) is the space of continuous linear functionals on ∆(Ω), with the definition f(µ) = R Ω f (·)dµ(·) (see e.g. Aliprantis and Border (1999, p. 208, thm. 5.83) 12 Therefore, when there is no common prior, there is a continuous function g ∈ C(Ω) such that R Ω g(·)dt 1 (ω)(·) < c < R Ω g(·)dt 2 (ω)(·) for every ω ∈ Ω. Defining f = g − c, we get R Ω f (·)dt 1 (ω)(·) < 0 < R Ω f (·)dt 2 (ω)(·), so f is a zero-sum bet that both players like to take. ¥ This proof generalizes a proof of Samet (1998a). Samet's proof of the characterization of common priors for more than two players can now be generalized using the same technique to yield a short proof of proposition 3.
